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Courtesy of China Marititime & Naval Inst Press

Book Reviews

Newport, RI: Joint
Publication of the
China Maritime
Studies Institute and
the Naval Institute
Press, 2010

China, The United States and 21st Century
Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security
Partnership
edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Nan Li
Reviewed by Richard Halloran, former foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in
Washington for The New York Times

A

t first glance, this collection of essays would appear to
be based on a questionable premise, that the People’s
Republic of China is interested in defining a maritime
partnership with the United States to keep the peace in
the western Pacific, the South China Sea, and the Indian
530 pages
Ocean. Repeated confrontations—verbal, at sea, and in
$47.95
the air—in recent years make that seem unlikely.
As the essays unfold, however, a more realistic assessment of China’s
naval capabilities and intentions appear over the horizon. In particular, contributions by a senior Chinese naval officer and several civilian scholars lead
to the conclusion that Sino-US naval relations are far more competitive than
cooperative and will continue to be well into the future.
These essays bear close reading because they faithfully reflect the
thinking and policies of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) and the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which comprises all of China’s armed forces.
The disclaimers that a contribution is based on personal opinion can be ignored
as can platitudes about “mutual trust” and “peaceful development.” Rear
Admiral Yang Yi, Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the PLA’s
National Defense University, is forthright: “One undeniable fact is that China
and the United States harbor strategic suspicions toward each other.”
Admiral Yang asserts that the United States is “bogged down” in the
Middle East and the US military is stretched so thin “that it has impaired the
routine building of its defense capability.” Conversely, he writes, China has
enjoyed political stability, economic prosperity, and a “Revolution in Military
Affairs with Chinese characteristics.” Moreover, he contends: “The United
States needs a threat like China to maintain its military hegemony,” with China
taking the role he says the Soviet Union played during the Cold War. Today,
he maintains, “only China can fulfill that role.” The admiral argues that China
and the United States are “both making military preparations for worst-case
scenarios in the Taiwan Strait.”
Taiwan, the self-governing island off the coast of China, is Chinese
territory in the eyes of Beijing. The United States says sovereignty is unsettled
and must be decided peaceably by people on both sides of the strait. Until that
difference is resolved, Admiral Yang concludes, “it is unrealistic for the PLA
and the US military to engage in substantial military cooperation.”
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A political scientist at Peking University, Yu Wanli, outlines the development of China’s naval strategy over the past six decades from coastal defense and
near-seas defense to the ambitions of some Chinese leaders to build a blue-water
navy. He makes the pertinent point, however, that China’s maritime strategy is
“subject to the influence of China’s traditional land power culture.” Dr. Wu states
that the late Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American maritime strategist, has influenced Chinese thinking but not to the point where the Chinese navy is ready to
adopt a “far-oceans strategy” or a “dominance of the oceans” doctrine. Instead,
he says, “there has emerged a great debate on sea power in China’s academic
and strategic thinking circles.” No matter how the debate turns out, Dr. Wu concludes, “almost all scholars agree that the development of Chinese sea power
will inevitably result in contradiction and conflict with the existing maritime
hegemon—the United States.”
An economist who is vice president of the National Institute for South
China Sea Studies, Zhu Huayou, focuses on the vital waterway through which
more shipping passes than through the Panama and Suez Canals combined.
That sea-lane is crucial to Southeast Asian nations, to China, Korea, and
Japan, and to US warships transiting between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Unfortunately, Dr. Zhu lapses into platitudes: “Increased mutual understanding
is the fundamental condition for Sino-US maritime cooperation.” He ducks the
critical issue, which is that China insists that it holds “indisputable sovereignty”
over what it claims is an internal sea while the United States considers it an
international passage governed by freedom of navigation.
Andrew S. Erickson, an experienced China hand, an editor of this
volume, and a political scientist at the Naval War College, is mildly optimistic
that the US Navy and the PLA Navy can reach an accommodation rather than
seeking to blow each other out of the water. He bases his positive view on the
US Maritime Strategy and a skeptical but serious Chinese response.
The 2007 Maritime Strategy emphasizes “conflict prevention,” securing the “global maritime commons” in the interests of both nations, and using
humanitarian operations “to build mutual trust.” Dr. Erickson says it has been
subjected to meticulous Chinese scrutiny, with translations passed to top leaders.
He warns, however, that “Chinese analysts express concern that the United
States retains power to threaten core Chinese interests,” including control of
Taiwan, sovereignty over the South China Sea, and sea-lane security. Those
concerns, he concludes, “offer a useful caution regarding the possibilities of
US-China cooperation in the near term.”
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Courtesy of Potomac Books, Inc.

Hannibal: The Military Biography of Rome’s
Greatest Enemy
by Richard A. Gabriel
Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., Professor
of Military History, US Army War College

A

ny biography, old or new, of Hannibal Barca is problematic. There are no Carthaginian textual sources
Washington, DC:
on
the
famous general, archeological evidence (although
Potomac Books,
fairly plentiful) does not give direct information on the man
Inc., 2011
or his life, and the two major Roman sources have been
288 pages
examined from every conceivable angle. Nevertheless,
$34.95
Richard Gabriel has published his take on the great
Carthaginian general, who, despite his eventual defeat, makes most great captains lists. This book complements Gabriel’s earlier biography of Hannibal’s
arch enemy Scipio Africanus (reviewed in Parameters Summer 2009) and is
based on much of the same research. Thus, Gabriel is not offering anything
particularly new; however, as with most of his books, he tells an old story in a
refreshingly readable manner.
We know virtually nothing about Hannibal’s childhood—what you find
is repetition of old legends, pure speculation, or extrapolation from archaeological evidence. Gabriel uses a little of each. He opens with an unnecessary scene
based on the disputed practice of Carthaginian child sacrifice, but overall he
gives a reasonable description of what a young Carthaginian boy of Hannibal’s
class might have experienced growing up. Similarly, lack of evidence makes
description of the Carthaginian military system difficult. The default model has
to be the Roman army, about which we have detailed information; however,
Carthage’s mercenary army would not have been trained, equipped, supplied,
administered, disciplined, or fought like their Roman opponents. Even assuming similarity of weapons after years of capturing Roman equipment, one cannot
infer Hannibal’s forces changed their tactical patterns or if they did, how. Gabriel
recognizes this and gives an informed assessment of the Carthaginian military.
One strength of Hannibal is its discussion of the strategic environment.
Gabriel gives a good assessment of the strategic situation and the choices (and
lack thereof) of the two sides. While it is common to recognize the strategic
significance of Roman seapower, Gabriel gives a more complete and thorough
analysis of the impact of seapower than many other authors. He points out
frequently during the narrative where Rome’s control of the seas inhibited
Hannibal or influenced events. Conversely, Gabriel can reason himself into
corners on minor points. For example, he asserts that the classical descriptions of the method of crossing the elephants over the Rhone River (ferrying
them on rafts with at least some jumping off partway across) seems to assume
the Carthaginians had limited knowledge of elephants, which they did not.
Gabriel’s alternative technique of enraging a dominant female and having her
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charge into the water while the herd followed makes no sense either. What
competent handler would purposefully start an elephant stampede in hopes they
would swim across a river just because they can swim? Sometimes, we need to
simply believe the source.
A more significant issue is the question first raised in antiquity of why
Hannibal never attacked Rome. Gabriel scoffs, I believe correctly, at the idea
that Hannibal could not attack Rome because he did not have siege equipment.
Ancient armies frequently constructed siege equipment on site, and there was
no unique technology involved. However, the idea that the defeat of Servilius’
cavalry in a skirmish after the Battle of Lake Trasimene (June 217 BC) left the
way open to Rome stretches credibility. Servilius had an intact consular army
at Ariminum on a good road not much farther from Rome than Hannibal, and
the consul would certainly have responded had the Carthaginians approached
the capital. Even after Cannae (August 216 BC), Hannibal did not have sufficient force to besiege a major city regardless of the magnitude of his victory.
In his narrative of the maneuvering before Cannae, the author emphasizes that
Hannibal had to resort to foraging to feed his army, and the presence of a Roman
force prevented that. The situation outside Rome would have been no different.
Unless one assumes Rome would have surrendered in panic at his approach,
regardless of when he attempted the feat, Hannibal would have had to besiege a
major, fortified city while simultaneously securing and protecting supplies and
fending off relief forces. He never had the requisite force to accomplish that,
and he did not think it was necessary. Hannibal believed he could defeat Rome
without capturing or destroying it. Gabriel would agree with the last statement
if not the previous.
Gabriel’s description of the Zama campaign and battle mirror the analysis in his biography of Scipio Africanus, which is to be expected. Gabriel has
little new to add to the story of Hannibal’s life after Zama, his exile, or his death.
Overall, there are better sources on specific issues, events, battles, and
campaigns of the Second Punic War. For example, Adrian Goldsworthy has
published an excellent book on Cannae (Cannae: Hannibal’s Greatest Victory,
Phoenix Press, 2007) and another on the entire struggle between Rome and
Carthage (The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146BC, Cassel, 2002).
Or, one might consult John Prevas’ Hannibal Crosses the Alps: The Invasion of
Italy and the Punic Wars (De Capo Press, 2001) on the route across the Alps,
a traditional controversy Gabriel avoids. Gabriel’s work is an academically
viable piece focused on Hannibal and aimed at a general audience, and as such
is a valuable addition to the literature.
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The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet
Freedom
Courtesy of Public Affairs

by Evgeny Morozov
Reviewed by Dennis M. Murphy, Professor of
Information in Warfare, Center for Strategic Leadership,
US Army War College

I

n January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave
a highly touted speech on Internet freedom in which
New York: Public
Affairs, 2011
she stated, “The freedom to connect is like the freedom
of assembly, only in cyberspace. It allows individuals to
409 pages
get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate. Once
$16.99
you’re on the Internet, you don’t need to be a tycoon or a
rock star to have a huge impact on society.” Evgeny Morozov, in his book The
Net Delusion, takes great issue with the implication, however, that the so-called
“Arab Spring” and “Twitter Revolution” were caused by unfettered access to the
Internet. Instead, Morozov, a research academic, provides a cautionary tale about
what he argues is any attempt to establish a monocausal relationship to meaningful political change (especially when that single focus is information technology).
The book opens with a discussion of cyber-utopianism and Internetcentrism—mind-sets that focus on the positive “emancipatory” aspects of Internet communication while ignoring the downsides. The argument throughout
centers on nation-state policy, or lack thereof, that attacks the “wicked” problem
of authoritarianism by, as a colleague of mine has dubbed it, “wiring the world.”
Morozov, expectantly, but importantly, cites the hedonistic world portrayed by
Huxley and the “Big Brother” world of Orwell to consider both the proactive and
reactive approaches to Internet freedom by authoritarian regimes. Interestingly,
he notes that there is often a mix of both. Such regimes certainly use the anonymity and openness of the Internet to spy on their people and shutdown undesirable
sites. But there is also a subtle approach that belies the jackboot on the keyboard
methodology. While China may be known more for suppressing the Internet
and for employing the masses to counter antiregime rhetoric, Russia imposes
no formal Internet censorship. It relies on entertainment (porn is specifically
cited) to soothe the masses, assuming that given options for political discourse
and anything else, most opt for “anything else.” Hitler would understand. And in
nations where freedom is not widely understood from a western perspective, any
bit of additional mindless diversion may be viewed as liberty by the populace.
Perhaps most importantly, Morozov rails against social media determinism as driving the end of authoritarianism, labeling it “an intellectually
impoverished, lazy way to study the past, understand the present, and predict
the future.” He does not dismiss the value of Facebook and Twitter to quickly
mobilize like-minded individuals. He notes as well that the development of
that very like-mindedness is complex and potentially can be manipulated by
authoritarian governments using the same Internet freedom. Morozov’s caution
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then is policymakers need to understand both the threats and opportunities
posed by Internet freedom. The fact that authoritarianism still exists in its many
forms serves as evidence to the complexity of the connections between the
Internet and the rest of foreign policymaking. The winds of information may be
“the oxygen of the modern age, seep[ing] through the walls topped by barbed
wire,” but the winds blow both ways. Policymakers need to focus on the ends
versus the means. What are the root causes of the wicked problem of authoritarianism in each of its individual cases? How will our foreign policy address
them in order to achieve our interests recognizing the outcome may likely be
the least-worst solution? Only when these tough questions are meaningfully
and thoughtfully addressed can one turn to the Internet as one potential means
to solve the problem. Furthermore, the threats of Internet freedom demand a
consideration of potential regulations regarding its use in a globalized world.
Examples of Google in China and Twitter in Iran come to mind. Once again, if
one dismisses social media determinism and accepts that authoritarian governments can use Internet freedom to their own ends, what restrictions must liberal
democracies consider in order to ensure protection and advancement of their
own interests?
Morozov is not balanced in his approach. He skews sharply toward the
threat of Internet freedom versus the opportunities it portends. He certainly
addresses both, but the uninformed reader may not pick out the nuanced attempts
at balance at the expense of supporting his thesis. Given that caution, The Net
Delusion is an extremely well-researched and interesting book. It should definitely be read by policymakers, and it will be of interest to anyone who cares
about the future of foreign policy which must include the role of unfettered
access to information. This reviewer will admit to being a rather avid contributor to Facebook, Twitter, and blogging as a means of professional discourse. Not
surprisingly, this reviewer began this reading leaning to the side of cyberutopianism. But Morozov’s arguments were able to move me rather significantly
toward the center; perhaps becoming a cyberrealist, if you will. Oliver Wendell
Holmes noted, “If you resist reading what you disagree with, how will you ever
acquire deeper insights into what you believe? The things most worth reading are
precisely those that challenge our convictions.” In that light, The Net Delusion
was worth the read.
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Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American NationBuilding from the Founders to Obama
Courtesy of Free Press

by Jeremi Suri
Reviewed by Louis J. Nigro, Jr., US Ambassador
(Retired), Ph.D, and author of The New Diplomacy in Italy

J

eremi Suri’s study of America’s experience with nationbuilding is an ambitious monograph that addresses a
New York: Free
critical
contemporary strategic and national security policy
Press, 2011
issue by putting it into historical perspective. In so doing,
358 pages
Suri makes an original, if not entirely satisfactory, contri$30.00
bution to the history of US diplomacy and foreign policy;
to the scholarly debate on “the American way of war”; and
to the policy debate over the usefulness and efficacy of nation-building as an
element in US national security policy and practice.
Suri, who is Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin,
took the title of his book from Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address, which
is a good place to start for this attempt to define what he considers America’s
most original and enduring contribution to “grand strategy.” The author’s thesis
is that the Founders’ great accomplishment was the first successful attempt to
build a nation-state out of its preexisting raw materials—political, demographic,
cultural, and economic. For Suri, the nation-building gene is the key strand in
America’s national DNA and the key to understanding America’s engagement
with the world since 1776. Nation-building created the new United States and
dictated its policy of continental expansion, as territories became states of the
Union across the continent. Nation-building has also characterized the US
approach to solving international problems and promoting international stability, becoming in the process America’s home-grown “grand strategy” in a
dangerous world.
Suri tests and illustrates his thesis by examining five American nationbuilding experiences. In “Reconstruction after Civil War,” he describes the
national effort to reconstruct a single and more perfect union as “the most intensive and aggressive nation-building endeavor of the nineteenth century.” The
author focuses on the work of a unique institution, the Freedmen’s Bureau, that
was the main civilian engine of the Northern effort to bring political, economic,
and social development to the backward, “failed state” that was the post-bellum
South. He emphasizes that Abraham Lincoln “looked back to . . . the American
founding to articulate Union aims in the Civil War.” Most historians would not
consider reconstruction of the former Confederacy as successful as Suri.
In “Reconstruction after Empire,” Suri examines how the United
States refused after the Spanish-American War to make the Philippines the
first piece of a traditional colonial empire and opted instead to create a new,
democratic nation-state and American ally in the Far Pacific, “navigating as
Americans always do between opposition to empire and fear of chaos.” The
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author concentrates on future President William Howard Taft’s civilian efforts
to implement America’s first attempted nation-building project outside the continental United States. He pays little attention to the intensive parallel military
effort there.
The chapter, “Reconstruction after Fascism,” addresses US policy
toward Germany after the Second World War, emphasizing the roles of
President Truman’s political decisiveness, former President Hoover’s vision
for post-war Western Europe, and the Marshall Plan, which institutionalized
Truman’s and Hoover’s ideas. The result was a “self-sustaining, sovereign
nation-state”—a democratic and prosperous Germany that anchored the US
strategy of “containing” the Soviet Union in Europe. This is Suri’s most successful application of his thesis.
“Reconstruction after Communist Revolution” is the author’s attempt to
tackle Vietnam, seeking an explanation of America’s ultimate strategic failure
by its refusal to engage Ho Chi Minh early in the post-war period and partner
with him to apply American nation-building experience in an effort to unify
and develop Vietnam. This requires the author to do some creative reimagining
of history. In “Reconstruction after September 11,” Suri praises General David
Petraeus’s management of the “surge” in Iraq, which he calls “a return to more
traditional American nation-building,” after the United States failed to apply
those “traditional” methods in Afghanistan soon after the quick military victory
there in 2001.
His “Conclusion: The Future of Nation-Building” attempts, not very
deftly, to lecture the current administration on foreign policy priorities by
advancing what Suri calls “the five Ps of nation-building, and politics in general:
Partnerships, Process, Problem-Solving, Purpose, and People.” This is the least
satisfactory part of the book.
The book has its faults, but the author makes a timely contribution by
using the past to inform and illuminate current scholarly and policy debates
related to nation-building. His imperfect but provocative effort should be
followed with more sustained inquiries by experts, not only into the early nationbuilding episodes Suri examines, but also other similar US efforts in Cuba,
Haiti, and Central America in the early twentieth century, as James Dobbins
and various collaborators have done for US nation-building enterprises since
the Second World War.
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The Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who
Infiltrated the CIA
Courtesy of Doubleday

by Joby Warrick
Reviewed by Dr. W Andrew Terrill, Research Professor,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College and the
author of Global Security Watch Jordan

O

n 30 December 2009 Dr. Humam al-Balawi, an al
Qaeda suicide bomber, killed seven CIA agents and a
New York:
Doubleday, 2011
Jordanian intelligence officer in Khost, Afghanistan. The
272 pages
Khost tragedy was widely viewed as a failure of CIA
tradecraft whereby an unusually large number of officers
$26.95
allowed themselves to be placed in a situation where they
could be killed in a single suicide strike. The background to this incident and
the reasons such problems occurred is the subject of Joby Warrick’s The Triple
Agent. Additionally, this book is also a consideration of the larger war against
al Qaeda and the ways in which the combatants wage that struggle.
The most important figure in this story is the suicide bomber himself,
Dr. Humam al-Balawi, a married Jordanian physician, with two daughters, who
maintained a seemingly stable life in his own country. Balawi was a tremendous
believer in the actions of al Qaeda including those of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
a terrorist detested in Jordan where his agents bombed three Amman hotels
causing 60 deaths in 2005. The victims of this assault included a number of
guests at a Jordanian/Palestinian wedding reception, although Balawi called
Zarqawi a “tiger” who should inspire true Muslims. The Jordanian physician
asserted this outlook and other views in Internet chat rooms where he posted
radical essays under a false name. These postings often appeared to be that of
a leader who was speaking for al Qaeda rather than a mere follower or fan. As
such, they rapidly attracted the attention of the Jordanian intelligence service
which easily established Balawi’s true identity.
As an Internet tough guy and dreamer, Balawi was no match for his
Jordanian interrogators. He broke rapidly under interrogation even without
torture, but in the face of a number of threats to his livelihood and the future
of his family. The Jordanian intelligence service viewed Balawi as soft and
weak and eventually decided that he might be pliable enough to serve them
as an intelligence asset. His case officer was Captain Ali bin Zaid, a top intelligence professional and distant relative of the Jordanian king. Bin Zaid made
the fateful decision to assume that this apparently timid man could be managed
through implied threats to his future and that of his family, and thereby turned
against al Qaeda as a double agent. In his conversations with Balawi, bin Zaid
was quick to point out the successes of Jordanian intelligence included helping
the United States track down and kill Zarqawi. These types of discussions were
meant to suggest Jordan was part of the winning coalition and was also more

126Parameters

Joby Warrick’s The Triple Agent

than capable of tracking down its enemies should Balawi ever chose to betray
the monarchy.
At bin Zaid’s instigation, Balawi was sent to Pakistan as a low value
Jordanian agent who cost little but was unlikely to produce much valuable intelligence. Balawi’s background as a physician and his previous online extremism
were viewed as potential ways to enter al Qaeda circles. If al Qaeda executed
him for security reasons, little would be lost. Yet this did not happen. Instead,
in a remarkably short period of time, Balawi was proven to be in contact with
al Qaeda’s mid-level leaders. He also claimed to have met with al Qaeda’s then
second in command (now its leader), Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although Zawahiri is
a physician, he was described as seeking out Balawi for medical advice on his
supposed diabetes and to help in acquiring difficult-to-obtain medicines. This
mesmerizing story seemed too good to be true, and it was. Rather than cracking
al Qaeda open, Balawi had quickly changed sides in line with his core convictions about that organization. Moreover, as the agent’s information became
more compelling, Warrick maintains that the CIA quickly became involved
as partners with the Jordanians. Warrick asserts that the intense frustration in
Washington over the government’s inability to find bin Laden and Zawahiri
generated increasing CIA excitement over Balawi and led to a fatal lack of
skepticism. According to Warrick, the CIA had no leads on the whereabouts of
either terrorist leader at the time. This frustration may have caused the CIA to
become especially willing to take the bait and believe an increasingly unbelievable cover story which then led to disaster.
In summary, this is a well-researched book that has a great deal to say
about the ways in which intelligence organizations under pressure can be drawn
into the deadliest of traps. Warrick’s discussion of the grinding war against al
Qaeda and the Jordanian role in it is also particularly interesting and worthwhile.
Less valuable is the extensive biographic information about the Americans
killed in the Khost strike. The biographical aspects of the book are apparently
meant to portray the bombing victims as human beings rather than statistics,
but this can easily become excessive. Somewhere there might be someone who
wants to know the details of how various CIA people met their spouses, fell in
love, or viewed their religious principles, but most readers will not care. Some
details such as a female CIA officer’s favorite hairdo (pigtails) come across as
especially irrelevant. Nevertheless, on balance, this is an exceptionally valuable book that is well worth the short time required to read it.
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New York: Ferrar,
Straus and Giroux,
2011

That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind
in the World It Invented and How We Can
Come Back
by Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum
Reviewed by James Jay Carafano, Director, Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The
Heritage Foundation

T

his is a test. If anyone reads That Used to Be Us: How
America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and
finds shockingly new ideas and issues—well that means
380 pages
they are probably not well read or sufficiently informed to
$28.00
deal with the strategic issues facing the nation. Three-time
Pulitzer Prize journalist Tom Friedman and Johns Hopkins foreign policy professor Michael Mandelbaum have rounded up the usual suspects to explain why
America is becoming less competitive on the global stage and what to do about it.
Friedman and Mandelbaum posit the United States faces four key challenges—staying ahead of the Information Technology revolution; the federal
deficit and unsustainable entitlement spending (read Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid); energy; and climate change. The authors also argue there are
five key “pillars” for the foundation of a competitive America—public education; modernizing infrastructure; immigration; government research and
development; and “necessary regulations on private economic activity.”
As a writer of global developments, Friedman earned a well-deserved
reputation as an astute observer. He engagingly described the emerging postCold War world in two mega-selling books The Lexus and the Olive Tree and
The World is Flat. This book is different. It purports to be prescription not just
surveillance. That’s a problem. The journalist’s eye is less well suited to crafting
strategy and offering sophisticated public policy analysis. Furthermore, there is
scant evidence that Mandelbaum’s academic discipline provided any balance to
the reporter’s notebook. Throughout That Used to Be Us, the authors’ choices
of problems and answers seem largely intuitive. There is no rigorous method
of analysis behind how they decided to fix all of America’s problems—beyond
their own gut judgments.
Even the basic premise of the book—the “key” problems to be solved is
a bit suspect. What seems to make these issues key is that they are all currently
in the headlines. Sure, for example, energy policy is an issue de jour. But is
ending our addiction to oil really the key to winning the future? What if there
is a spectacular breakthrough in nanotechnology that dramatically reduces the
size, power, and weight requirements for all the tools of modern life— revolutionizing “how” and what kinds of energy are required?
Nor do Friedman and Mandelbaum appear to understand how global
change really happens. They see the world functioning in a linear fashion that
can be managed mostly by sage governments and directive polices. Often,
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world changing innovation does not happen on demand or by design. Again,
energy offers a good example. The advance of the Industrial Revolution was
heavily dependent on discovering new and more efficient sources of energy.
The greatest boost occurred largely by accident—the result of a handful of
entrepreneurs in Pennsylvania hawking a cleaner-burning lamp oil.
The pillars of progress also invoke head scratching. Why exactly are
they the indisputable pillars of prosperity? Mostly, it seems, because the authors
want government to play a greater role. The authors have a clear prejudice
for “big” government—and that really skews how they see the world—often
leading them to observations that are just not true. Take the case of government
research and development (R&D). After the Cold War, the ratio of government
to private sector flipped. Today, private sector R&D eclipses what the government spends—and the size of our economy has more than doubled since the
end of the Cold War. Likewise, before the turn of the 20th century, government
R&D had a negligible affect on economic growth. Arguably, the Cold War was
an anomaly and not standard practice for ensuring the innovation that drives
American prosperity. Other pillars look equally shaky on close inspection. A
good percentage of the key 19th century infrastructure in the United States from
roads, to canals. to railroads was built by the private sector.
As to what role national security plays in the prescription offered in
That Used to Be Us—the answer is not much. In well over 300 pages of text,
Friedman and Mandelbaum offer about one paragraph worth of ideas. “In the
cuts in spending that America will have to make,” they conclude, “foreign policy
cannot be exempt. Defense spending is invariably among the biggest item in
the federal budget, and it too, will have to be reduced . . . they have become
too expensive. We need these resources, in other words, for nation-building in
America.” This amounts to little more than fuzzy math. Defense is hardly the
heart of Washington’s fiscal problems. When Eisenhower complained about the
Military-Industrial Complex, Pentagon spending was half the federal budget.
Today it represents less than a fifth of what Washington shells out. Furthermore,
as a percentage of spending our national wealth, defense (including the costs
of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) is about half the average of military
spending during the Cold War. The armed forces are not the problem. In fact,
gutting defense to reign in federal spending (an old Washington habit) actually
exacerbates fiscal crisis because it allows politicians to ignore dealing with the
hard issues—getting a handle on entitlement spending.
Also missing from Friedman and Mandelbaum’s glib treatment of
national security is any consideration of the “opportunity costs” incurred by
unpreparedness. It is much more expensive to rebuild a military than maintain
one. It is also cheaper to deter war and dissuade competition than fight a real
shooting conflict that emerges in part because potential enemies were allowed
to lay their plans unchecked by any fear of American military might.
That Used to Be Us is strategist eye candy. It is a treasure-trove of
slick ideas, easy button answers, and sweeping generalizations. Picking it apart
ought to be good practice for serious security analysts. With that said, Friedman
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and Mandelbaum are correct in that America’s competitive advantage is at risk.
Keeping the United States a first-class competitor depends largely on revitalizing the nation’s capacity for economic growth and innovation. Real American
grand strategists must master domestic policies not just foreign affairs.

Philip II of Macedon: Greater than Alexander

Courtesy of Potomac Books

by Richard A. Gabriel
Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts
and Doctrine, US Army War College

I

n Philip II of Macedon: Greater than Alexander, historian Richard Gabriel seeks to elevate Alexander’s
father, Philip II, to a “greater general and national king”
than was his son. He is a member of a growing number
Washington, DC:
Potomac Books,
of historians who seek relevant insights to present prob2010
lems from the distant accounts of Greek and Roman wars.
318pages
Gabriel is a distinguished professor in the Department of
$29.95
History and War Studies at the Royal Military College
of Canada and in the Department of Defence Studies at
the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He has written numerous books and
articles on military history.
What Gabriel seeks in this work is to examine “Alexander’s inheritance” in detail. The author claims that “Philip’s legacy was so significant that
without it, there would have been no Alexander the Great.” He goes on to state
that “Philip was a military genius who invented the military instrument that
allowed Alexander to carry out his conquest of Asia.”
The book’s first three chapters are short and readable accounts of
Philip’s personality, his strategic environment, and the Macedonian war
machine. Gabriel also argues that “Philip was a supreme strategist in that he
understood the place of war in policy, and he knew its limits.” Philip had a
manifest preference for political solutions over military ones, and was flexible in his willingness to change course politically or militarily when events
required. Philip’s grand strategy had two aims: to unify the Macedonian state
into an effective national entity, and to expand Macedon’s hegemony over all
of Greece. When Philip came to power after the defeat and death of his brother
Aymtas, for all practical purposes, the Macedonian Army had ceased to exist.
Over the next 24 years Philip innovatively created a balanced and modern
Macedonian war machine that transformed warfare itself. Gabriel states that
“Philip’s creation of the first competent corps of Macedonian infantry was
not only an achievement of military genius but also an experiment in social
engineering.” This Macedonian phalanx employed a longer spear, or sarrisa,
than Greek hoplites, also elevated peasants to paid members of the king’s “foot
companions and changed infantry combat completely by providing a unit with
greater combat power, flexibility, and maneuverability than the traditional
hoplite phalanx.” Philip also reformed his cavalry from a noble mob incapable
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of defeating infantry hoplites to arguably the most effective cavalry arm in
antiquity capable of breaking opposing infantry by employing penetrating
wedge formations. In addition, Philip created a logistics service capable of
supporting distant expeditionary operations and an engineering arm capable of
successfully conducting sieges.
The remaining six chapters are an engaging narrative survey of the
numerous campaigns of Philip. These cover the period from 359 BCE when he
assumed responsibility for governing Macedonia, through his unification and
expansion of Macedonia to his becoming the hegemon of Greece, and ending
with his assassination in 336 BCE. One of Gabriel’s interesting arguments is
that the Persians, not Alexander’s mother Olympias, were probably behind
Philip’s death because of motive, means, and opportunity.
Even though the sources dealing with Phillip are limited, the author succeeds in bringing Philip II’s dramatic story to life. He credits Philip with creating
a strong sense of national identity among the diverse peoples of his realm as a
strategic base. Phillip also saw war as only one of several means to obtain his
goals. Phillip much preferred to achieve his strategic objectives by employing
other less kinetic, but smart, power means such as diplomacy, bribery, or even
marriage. To Gabriel, Philip was the ultimate and better strategist than Alexander,
who relied too much on the single strategic option of his magnificent army.
This reviewer believes that Gabriel fails to completely prove his contention that Philip was a greater overall general than Alexander. He acknowledges
that “there is no doubt that Alexander was a brilliant tactician in his own right”
as Alexander employed tactics he learned from Philip. But, while Alexander
never lost a battle and conquered the mighty Persian Empire, Philip lost several
battles, sieges, skirmishes, and never made it out of the Balkans.
While the research for this book is extensive, Gabriel makes several
assertions about the Macedonian Army and its enemies not supported by recent
scholarship. For example, he states that prior to Phillip, Macedonian infantry
“were little more than untrained peasants,” when most likely Macedonian tribesmen resembled the peltasts of their neighbors. The author also presents the primary
reason for Phillip’s defeat at the hands of the Phocians during the Sacred War as a
result of Phillip being ambushed by massed “stone-throwing catapults.” Gabriel
awards the Phocian leader “Onomachus the distinction of being the father of field
artillery” for this brilliant military innovation. Modern scholars, however, have
suggested that the “stone throwers” may have been using their hands and not
machines. Regardless, Philip II of Macedon: Greater than Alexander is a must
for readers interested in ancient military history or for a current perspective of the
strategic parallels between today and the classical world.
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Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton,
Bradley and the Partnership that Drove the
Allied Conquest in Europe

New York: NAL
Caliber, 2011

by Jonathan W. Jordan
Reviewed by LTC Matthew D. Morton, Regional Fellow,
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,
and author of Men on Iron Ponies: The Death and Rebirth
of the Modern U. S. Cavalry

J

onathan Jordan knows how to tell a good story filled
with colorful heroes, a well-chosen complement of sup$28.95
porting characters, villains, and events that permit readers
to consider the protagonists’ actions against the backdrop
of war at the operational level. As a historian, he draws on a wide array of archival
material to capture the state of mind in which Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley
went about their business, especially when dealing with each other. In fulfilling
the roles of storyteller and historian, the author makes a strong case for his thesis
that Allied success in Western Europe during World War II was in large part a
function of the special chemistry that existed between these very different men.
The author uses an attention-grabbing prologue set in the icy Ardennes as a point
of departure for his argument before describing the unbroken chain of events
that led to a critical meeting at Verdun in 1944 and beyond to victory in 1945.
In the early going, Jordan succinctly describes how each of the protagonists spent their time between the end of the war to end all wars and the
beginning of the war that would make them into household names. Eisenhower,
initially the junior partner, and Patton forged their friendship around tanks, of
all things, and ideas associated with a new way of waging war that dominated
the minds of so many during the interwar years, even as it was suppressed to
varying degrees by the institutional army. Patton introduced Ike to Fox Connor,
who, in conjunction with Douglas MacArthur, transformed a minor league
coach—a tactical thinker—into one of the greatest general managers of war,
writ large at the nexus of operations and strategy. Bradley, the team player, built
his reputation as a trainer and solid soldier garnering the attention of the story’s
most important supporting character of all, George C. Marshall. Patton did what
he had to in an effort to make sure he did not miss the next war; this included
playing upon his personal relationships with Marshall and others. Although
Patton and Bradley served together in Hawaii, and Bradley and Eisenhower
were West Point classmates, there was no single context that brought them
together other than their collective desire to please Marshall, thus making
“brothers” an apt part of the book’s title as they all vied for the attention of the
Army’s father on the eve of the United States’ involvement in World War II.
Jordan charts the meteoric rise of all three men as the Army expanded,
prepared, and deployed to North Africa and the Mediterranean theater. By the
end of the African campaign and the subsequent liberation of Sicily, Patton
654 pages
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emerged as an able warfighter at the Army level. So much so that Eisenhower
could ill afford to part with him, even in the light of the slapping incident.
Bradley, once an understudy, moved past Patton only to learn that senior or
subordinate, his relationship with the dashing cavalryman was always going to
be complicated. Ike earned the starring role for D-Day and the associated headaches that came with it. In this story, the problems were rarely the Germans,
but more often than not, the British. Chief among them, cast in the role of lead
villain, was Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. Jordan effectively uses
Montgomery, and everything about him, as a reference point to trace the shifting views held by all three American generals, but also to track the changing
nature of their dealings with one another.
Ashore in Europe, Bradley emerges as a solid choice for Army and
Army group leadership. He gets high marks for the COBRA breakout and
escapes serious criticism for his role at Falaise and in the Ardennes. Patton,
driving through the hole created by Bradley, gets Eisenhower’s campaign back
on track with a dramatic demonstration of the open warfare concepts they had
debated as junior officers and neighbors in the early 1920s. He delivers again
in the Ardennes and beyond the Rhine, but sadly fails when asked to reinvent
himself as the military governor of Bavaria. Throughout the book, Eisenhower
evolves a more sophisticated coalition leader, sometimes at the expense of
those who served him so well while he gained his footing in Africa and Sicily.
Patton provides the energy that keeps the pages turning. What will he
do next? Did he really say that? Jordan lends more color to Ike and Bradley by
reaching beyond their postwar edited and reconsidered thoughts to the papers
of those closest to them when the events played out. By the end of the book,
one can almost see Kay Summersby hovering at Ike’s side in a cloud of cigarette smoke. Thoughts of Bradley require an uncomfortable shift in the chair
contemplating his hemorrhoid surgery as a personal prelude to the invasion of
Sicily. All generals emerge as something more than plaster saints.
Jordan has done an admirable job in creating balance while describing
how each man’s role contributed to the success of the others, but a bookshelf
straining under the weight of Weinberg, D’Este, Blumenson, Ambrose, and
Pogue need not make room to accommodate this newest offering. The reader
searching for critical analysis of the crisis case studies—Kasserine, the failure
to close the Falaise Gap, and the Ardennes—will be better served elsewhere.
Someone new to the study of World War II will enjoy this readable account that
should lead them in search of a broader perspective of the war and the richly
detailed bibliography points the way.
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On China
Courtesy of The Penguin Press

by Henry Kissinger
Reviewed by Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, COL (USA Retired),
Col Wortzel served two tours of duty as a military
attaché at the US Embassy in China.

I

n On China, Henry Kissinger has written an excellent history and analysis of China’s political culture.
He
emphasizes the historical influences on how China
New York: The
Penguin Press, 2011
approaches relations with other nations. Also, based on
his own experience and extensive research, Kissinger
586 pages
provides insight on how Chinese leaders approach nego$36.00
tiations. The book is well researched and takes advantage
of a variety of sources, including Kissinger’s own records of conversation.
Throughout the book, Kissinger looks at what he sees as key events that
shape how Chinese leaders, indeed, even the general populace, draw on China’s
traditions and classical culture when developing domestic or foreign policies.
Henry Kissinger portrays China’s classical past as key to understanding how
Beijing relates to other countries. Powerful emperors isolated themselves
and treated other states and peoples as vassal states over which the “Middle
Kingdom,” China, or Zhongguo, exercised suzerainty.
In the prologue, the author deftly weaves in the blend of Confucian
thinking and the military maxims of Sun Tzu, which influence interpersonal
relations and military thought today. Yet, in some places, Kissinger is surprisingly narrow and dogmatic. On page 15, he tells the reader “The Chinese never
generated a myth of cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese
themselves, whose values . . . were conceived of as Chinese in origin.”
In reality, while interpersonal relations and the structure of Chinese
society is heavily influence by Confucius, there are a number of creation myths
in China. Central to them are a sense of a primordial, comingled, and chaotic
heaven and earth. According to one Taoist myth, a god, Pangu, separated earth
from heaven like a yolk from an egg. Parts of his body became wind, water,
the moon, mountains, dirt, and stone. In another myth, of Taoist and Buddhist
origin, a successor goddess, Nuwa, used clay to make men and animals. Enough
mythology; the point is that while Kissinger’s research staff was excellent, the
reader must realize that Henry Kissinger is writing the history of China in a way
that also validates his interpretation of events. To get beyond Kissinger’s own
biases, one must read more widely and not take On China as gospel.
There are other historical interpretations that challenge Kissinger’s
description of the Opium Wars. In On China, he adopts the Chinese perspective and describes invasion and domination by foreign powers, which
weakened the Qing Dynasty and led to the warlord period. The author explains
how the forced creation of extraterritorial zones in China created the sense
of a “century of humiliation” that pervades Chinese education and influences
the sensitivity of Chinese leaders to matters of sovereignty. But there are
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other interpretations. Julia Lovell, in The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and
the Making of China, describes how the Qing Dynasty crumbled because of
poor leadership, corruption, affectation, and ritual. For Lovell, the reasons for
China’s decline and the imperial successes of Western powers were because
the Qing had created “an impressive but improbable high-wire act, unified by
ambition, bluff, pomp and pragmatism.”
These flaws aside, On China has strengths that make it an important
book for students of China and US diplomatic history. Kissinger describes
personal contacts and meetings with some of the most influential and important figures in recent Chinese politics. His accounts of encounters with Mao
Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng, and a host of other Chinese
leaders are superb. And Kissinger is able to discuss the events surrounding
the meetings in the context of the policy issues facing the United States. The
accounts in On China are accurate when compared to the descriptions in Ezra
Vogel’s Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China.
In describing the arrival of the American delegation sent by President
Nixon to China, Kissinger provides outstanding detail on how the US team
prepared for its 9 July 1971, visit. He complements this with a parallel description of the way that Zhou Enlai had prepared the Chinese diplomatic team to
receive and escort the Americans. Zhou had selected the Chinese diplomats two
years earlier when “the idea of opening to the United States” was debated at the
highest levels of China’s civilian and military leadership. Marshall Ye Jianying
greeted Kissinger in Beijing. Ye was one of four PLA marshals tasked by Mao
Zedong to analyze strategic options for China.
There is probably no other senior figure who can discuss how a series of
American presidents maintained continuity in China policy better than Henry
Kissinger. He includes a critical description of the policy options explored by
President George H.W. Bush after the massacre of Chinese workers and students
when the People’s Liberation Army ended the Tiananmen Square demonstrations on 4 June 1989. Bush had to navigate between Americans who “argued
for Confrontation, urging the United States to resist undemocratic behavior
or human rights violations,” and proponents of engagement, who argued that
“human rights progress is generally better reached by a policy of engagement.”
The same debate is raging today in the United States, compounded
by questions about China’s currency valuation and the nation’s investments
in American treasury bonds. When dealing with a nation that is a member of
the Permanent-Five in the United Nations Security Council, it is difficult for
any president, or for realists in Congress, to subscribe to a single-issue foreign
policy. Kissinger is always the pragmatist and by reading On China one comes
away with a sense of the policy dilemmas facing America’s leaders as well as
the decisionmaking process inside China.

Spring 2012

135

Book Reviews

Omar Bradley: General at War

Courtesy of Regenry History

by Jim DeFelice
Reviewed by COL Dennis D. Tewksbury, Strategic
Plans Senior Analyst, Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute, US Army War College

A

dmit it, the first images that come to mind when you
hear the name Omar Bradley are either of a wirerimmed
glasses-wearing, bookish-looking math teacher or
Washington, DC:
Regenry History,
actor Karl Malden portraying the greatly admired general
2011
in the movie Patton. Jim DeFelice’s book, Omar Bradley:
400 pages
A General at War provides the reader with an excellent
$29.95
resource for understanding who the GI general was, how
he evolved into a wartime leader, and the critical relationships and challenges he faced throughout World War II. The reader will
certainly gain a greater understanding of who this distinguished general was,
how he made decisions, and how he led.
As DeFelice explains, this book fills a perceived void—that of an “impartial, easily accessible summary and evaluation of [General Omar Bradley’s]
life . . . .” Opining that historians have either “forgotten or miscast” Bradley,
the author endeavors to explain why this general should be hailed as one
of the architects of success in Europe. Finally, DeFelice believes we cannot
understand our victory in Europe without understanding Bradley.
To help with his cause, the author draws upon a number of original sources in the presentation of his assertions. First, and certainly most critical to
the project, he utilizes General Bradley’s personal and professional papers
housed in West Point’s Omar N. Bradley Collection. Aiding the author with
firsthand observations were the personal papers and diaries of Bradley’s aide,
Chester Hansen. These, in particular, fill the gaps by supplying context to
statements made by various personalities throughout the book. In addition to
other primary sources, the author relies on Bradley’s two books as well as
a number of other works covering such World War II titans as Eisenhower,
Patton, Montgomery, and Marshall.
An important component of any biography is the story of the individual’s
formative years. DeFelice does a nice job of presenting material that provides the
reader an understanding of Bradley’s humble upbringing and how growing up in
rural Missouri impacted his professional development. The general’s discipline,
studious approach toward problem solving, sense of fair play, and unrelenting
commitment can be traced to the manner in which Bradley was raised.
The most interesting portions of the book are those devoted to Bradley’s
professional relationships. DeFelice devotes a significant number of pages
toward debating the manner in which other authors portray Bradley’s relationship with various peers and superiors. He provides the reader with insight into
the friction and controversy that existed between many battlefield commanders during the war. Generals Patton and Montgomery warrant several pages,
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which makes sense considering the amount of time these three leaders worked
together. The constant friction between the key leaders makes one grateful they
somehow managed to get past their egos, personalities, and self-serving issues
in their efforts to win the war in Europe. As DeFelice describes the competition
between the coalition generals, we gain a greater appreciation for the difficult
task General Eisenhower had with balancing those egos. The reader will come
to understand the struggles senior leaders endured more than sixty years ago that
continue to transcend the ages. Politics and personalities were critical factors
in every major decision throughout the Second World War; even today, they
continue to bedevil military leaders.
Another timeless topic is the never-ending love-hate relationship between General Omar Bradley and the press and his eventual acceptance of the
value in holding regular press conferences. Odd, some things never change.
What today’s leaders can gain from Bradley’s story is an appreciation for the
pressures that come with leadership. There are multiple accounts in which the
reader can empathize with the general, such as when he is planing the break out
from the Normandy and the turnaround of American efforts in North Africa,
all while dealing with the multitude of strong personalities that filled the ranks
of the Allied Army. Today’s operational and strategic leaders can relate to
these challenges.
In the end, DeFelice accomplishes his mission—to provide the reader
with a deeper appreciation of General Omar Bradley. The book is a worthwhile
read. Although it appears at times the author goes out of his way to defend
Bradley, he does not shy away from offering criticism of the man. DeFelice’s
point-counterpoint with other authors appears at times as a history food fight and
detracts from an otherwise excellent work. This work is an easy read for Bradley
fans as well as those unfamiliar with the general and seeking insight into the life
of one of America’s great leaders. DeFelice covers all the critical points. He provides a link to a number of other commendable works such as, Omar Bradley’s
A Soldier’s Story and A General’s Life: An Autobiography. This book provides
an opportunity to further examine controversial decisions, contentious relationships, and the continuing debate as to which leader was the best of World War II.
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